



NATIONAL DIALOGUE AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

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NATIONAL DIALOGUE AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

The African continent still remains in the grip of numerous conflicts that constitute a serious impediment to its development. For this reason, it would presumably be necessary to initiate a reflection process in order to facilitate the effectiveness of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. This task cannot be completed without returning in our cultural values so as to understand how our ancestors attempted to prevent and resolve conflicts which inevitably arose between kingdoms, families and/or tribes.

Understanding the mechanisms of management and conflict resolution necessarily requires knowledge of the environment, land and customs of the people attached to it. It is all of these elements and their interactions that will generally identify the effective mechanism to provide a deterrent, preventive and solving conflicts weapon.

An observation of the habits and customs seems to show that in Africa, since a long time, any actor who wants to intervene in the settlement or conflict prevention should favor dialogue. This is a major tool in governance because it helps to make rules or mechanisms to prevent and resolve social conflicts.

I / Social dialogue in Africa, an ancient practice

The term « dialogue » that comes from the Greek is composed by two entities dia- and logos respectively meaning "between" and "speech, intellect" a word therefore shared between several people or group of people. As the etymology suggests, dialogue appealed to reason, active listening that tracks a thought so as to hear its essence, to translate emotions and fears. The ultimate goal in this type of communication exercise is not to be right on the receiver but, in complementary viewpoints, to search together and selflessly consensus if not the truth.

This type of dialogue is known in many traditional African societies. It was the instrument that allowed societies to rebalance whenever crises or conflicts threaten the foundations of the family or community. In this exercise of dialogue, it is the group cohesion that is sought or restarting a political system deemed a failure.

In the early 1990s, under the name of national dialogue or sovereign national conference, the dialogue between the different forces of nations has been, with more or less success, enabling transition from one system to another. The democratization process initiated by these "Sovereign National Conferences" has enabled the introduction of multi-party system, trade union and political pluralism (in many countries the one-party system has given way to multi-party), and a reorientation or guidance of economy, organizing pluralist elections, drafting of new constitutions taking into account the people's aspiration. It was thus in Benin, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Central Africa, Togo, Niger, Mali, etc.

In this democratic wind blowing in Africa, civil society organizations have emerged and increased social protest. For the purposes of this report, we will consider the case of Benin, Guinea, Burkina Faso's very recent one, etc. Benin, for being the first country in

1990 to experiment with this tool that wants consensus; the political history of Guinea, without being similar to that of Benin, has many similarities. Guinea has experienced in the context of security sector reform a national dialogue framework in which civil society played an important role. Burkina Faso is the latest model. Despite the violence that went with President Compaoré's departure and the last attempted coup by elements of the former RSP, the situation could have been worse if traditional and religious authorities had not engaged in mediation.

Thus, studying the traditional culture from the perspective of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, it is a way to place dialogue and culture of peace in its historical scope and to note that in their concern for conflict prevention and resolution, the African peoples have always given an utmost importance to negotiation and dialogue procedures. Moreover it is in this perspective that we can remember the spirit of the *palaver tree*.

A / The spirit of the Palaver tree in African traditions

Etymologically, the word "palaver" comes from the Spanish "palabra" meaning speech, discussion. As organizational framework for discussion, expression of opinions, adversarial debates, advice, negotiation and positive review, the palaver tree was a place of deployment of various mechanisms of deterrence and arbitration. In this sense, it has always been an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in black Africa.

The institution of the palaver tree as the preferred resolution and conflict prevention is not accidental. Indeed, African society is fundamentally rooted in the tradition of orality which is the most obvious expression of the vitality of a culture of peace, dialogue and discussion¹.

The palaver is characterized by its sacredness. The exchanges, discussions and negotiations which operate it are tinted proverbs, parables, tales, myths and genealogies. The palaver is so the source of rich teachings. These discussions gush moral lessons, warnings, cautions and recommendations.

The originality of the African palaver² lies in its impartial and neutral finality. In the course of the dialogues, actors advocate in their approach, weighting, compromise and harmony. The palaver is an art that can reach a solution in case of conflict. It may also play a role in preventing potential conflicts. The objective of the talking is not to judge or condemn a party. As recalled by Professor Bah "*Palaver appears rather as a logotherapy that aims to break the vicious circle of violence and counter-attack in order to restore*

¹ Thierno Bah, "Les mécanismes traditionnels de prévention et de résolution des conflits en Afrique noire", in endogenous foundations of a culture of peace in Africa, traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in Africa, UNESCO, Paris, 1999.

² African countries are not the only ones to practice the palaver. Japanese societies practice ringesei, a sort of permanent palaver putting in order in the society a provisional consensus for cooperation and a negotiated and temporary interaction.

*harmony and peace*³. Indeed, what is being sought through the institution of the palaver is the peaceful consensus, the entente cordiale, understanding, the spirit of transcendence.

It is known in West Africa, particularly in Dongo's, in Mali that, in case of conflict, "*both parties share responsibilities, the paramount consideration is the maintenance of internal tranquility, after a mutual forgiveness*"⁴. Similarly, in countries like Dahomey, now Benin, most conflicts were settled under the palaver tree with strong involvement of village elders who were the inclusive actors of a sincere and constructive social dialogue. This requires, in practice diplomacy, an art of permanent and fruitful dialogue with all stakeholders.

Moreover, like any institution, the palaver is governed by specific rules. As part of ongoing dialogue, prevention and resolution of conflicts or the palaver is governed by strict principles.

B / The palaver, a framework of structured and effective dialogue

The palaver is a very organized institution. The rules are clear and always allow to reach the aims. In order to so, in palaver, participants and actors in talks and debates that take place must prove extensive experience. That was how the elders were playing a leading role.

The elders, considered as wise men were the main actors or mediators in palaver. This is easily justified if we remember the famous quote Amadou Hampathé Bah, "In Africa, when an old person dies, it's a library that burns down". With their knowledge of African proverbs, their experience and wisdom, the elders were key players in palavers animation. Populations vowed them respect and significant esteem.

Throughout Black Africa there is, apart from a few differences, the same concept of the talking, considered a total phenomenon, in which overlap sacredness, authority and knowledge the latter being played by old men who have accumulated, over the years, wisdom and experience⁵. This means while the palaver was well structured and obeyed strict conditions. Among the *Beti* of southern Cameroon for example, no fewer than six terms and conditions are a prerequisite for any palaver: where, when, who, what, why,

³Thierno Bah, "Les mécanismes traditionnels de prévention et de résolution des conflits en Afrique noire", in endogenous foundations of a culture of peace in Africa, traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in Africa, UNESCO, Paris, 1999.

⁴Dieterlen, G, et Fortes, M, "African systems of Thought", London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

⁵ In southern Gabon, there were initiatory secret societies who lived the last receptacles, the guardians of traditions handed down from generation to generation. The populations in specific geographic areas, perpetuated these traditions within the secret societies that were and are the expression of one common traditional background it is expressed in diversity. They taught a wisdom whose precepts used by traditional leaders harbored the necessary dialogue to solve conflicts. These precepts of tolerance, acceptance of the other, the concern of the compromise were the basis of any successful negotiation. Monique V. Mavoungou-Bouyou, cultural mechanisms of prevention and resolution of conflicts in pre-colonial societies in southern Gabon: traditional in intercultural dialogue and a culture of peace practices in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, Volume 2, UNESCO, 2005

how? The *nkul* (drum made from a hollowed tree trunk) announces to all the surrounding villages, holding palaver (ekwaneayôn)⁶

However, the place given to old people do not question the involvement of all generations and social categories. The rich, the poor, women and youth, all had their words to say and to share their opinions. The palaver is in principle open to all, it is a part of social freedom and political expression⁷. Speaking of African palaver, former South African President Nelson Mandela wrote in his autobiography: *"Everyone who wanted to speak did. It was democracy in its purest form. There could be hierarchical differences between those who spoke, but everyone was heard."*

Thus, thanks to its wealth, its pragmatism and its techniques, the purpose of the palaver was often reached. The actors could often conclude a compromise between the belligerents. . To do this, the decisions in line with resolving permanently or gradually the conflict were taken and mediation is often resorted to implement them.

The mediators were chosen or appointed based on their age, they were old men, elders and notables. According to Fweley Diangitukwa, in the selection of mediators, the criterion of wisdom and knowledge of their clans and lineages history prevailed, but clans and lineages of the conflicting groups as well⁸

In contemporary times, it is fortunate that major conflicts in Africa are being treated in a context of dialogue according to ancestral processes of negotiation and peace restored. The virtues of palaver have also inspired the desire to formulate a new kind of governance that has accompanied the democratization process in many African countries (Benin, Congo, Gabon, Chad, etc.). In this, one can see in the sovereign national conferences, like a reinvention of African palaver in a context of modernity.

II / Social dialogue, tested by practice in African countries

Dialogue is undoubtedly an African tradition, as being rooted in black culture. Thus, throughout the centuries although the methods have evolved and changed over time, the dialogue is back on other forms itself as a mechanism, a tool to resolve and / or prevent conflicts. Only, we should admit that dialogue has succeeded in many cases, it experienced the limits in other cases. All the more that the fight for peace is never a foregone conclusion. It remains constant and progressive because that enormous challenges, it stops.

⁶ Lanciné Sylla, "Démocratie de l'arbre à palabre et bois sacré (Essay on the parallel power of African societies initiation)," *Annals of the University of Abidjan, Series D*, T.13, 1980.

⁷ The palaver obeyed some prerequisites. Discussions passed peacefully in mutual respect with the background to a consensus. To do this, active listening is valued because it is what facilitates dialogue and ensures consensus. In case of difficulty, the wise men and scholars are consulted to resolve disputes.

⁸ Jean Louis Mbengue, "Résolution des conflits et promotion de la paix chez les Beti du sud Cameroun", historical monograph, doctoral seminar, University of Yaounde I, 1995.

Only as recognized by African wise men, the maturity of a people is evaluated, not by the number of tragedies that they have known, but by how they manage these tragedies peacefully and smoothly. It is symptomatic that the dialogue in Africa has experienced its pedigree but its weaknesses are also noted.

A / Dialogue in Africa in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa

Political conflicts in Africa require in general a cultural and sociological understanding, in that they often put into opposition social groups belonging to the same mother spawn, but often with different ethnic groups. This is accentuated in the aftermath of independence in Africa when the continent inherited artificial borders that put highlight of peoples and split share cultures.

Added to this are new issues of democratization, consolidation of the nation state, apartheid, all issues that seem to confirm that most conflicts were part of a more fragmented than the frame traditional societies. The context was difficult and problematic situation. Faced with this complex situation, conflicts have broken on both sides of the continent. In Liberia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, South Africa, Rwanda⁹, DRC Everywhere, the African continent is ruined by fratricidal wars, civil wars not to mention poverty, economic dictatorship, the doldrums, coups to name a few.

To meet the multiple challenges arising from conflicts, African have tried several methods but the one that interests us most is the dialogue mechanism as prevention and conflict resolution tool.

Dialogue is the only framework for the building of trust between the actors, essential to the effective reconciliation, peace and sustainable development in the Great Lakes region where the issue of the return of peace must necessarily pass through certain prerequisites including the establishment of a dialogue between the governments of the region and their respective oppositions.

Rwanda's institutionalized dialogue

In Rwanda, the "Gacaca" played an important role in social mediation. They talked about "Kunga", which is a way to facilitate to both conflicting parties to resume dialogue and somewhat deteriorated relationship. This Rwanda's great innovation is noteworthy. By mixing the culture with justice, the initiators of the "Gacaca" responded to court necessities while not neglecting the dialogue and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.

In view of those considerations, the closure issue of these "people's courts" is mentioned in national dialogues. Moreover, in Rwanda, national dialogues are organized regularly.

In the aftermath of the civil war that ruined an entire people, the dialogue between the communities has once again become the credo of the Rwandan population. *"It is a sine qua non, the only framework for building the climate of trust between ethnic groups, which*

⁹ Sometimes however, for privacy reasons, young children and women deemed talkative (Ekobókobò) are excluded.

is essential to the effective reconciliation, peace and sustainable development in the Great Lakes region”¹⁰

Familiarly referred Umushyikirano, national dialogue is institutionalized in Rwanda and it is a constitutional rule described in Article 168 of the supreme law which enshrines it in his words:*is hereby established a “National Council of Dialogue”. It meets the President of the Republic and 5 people representing the Council of each district and each city designated by their peers. It is chaired by the President of the Republic in the presence of members of the Government, Parliament and Province prefects, the Mayor of Kigali City and other people that could be appointed by the President of the Republic. The Board meets at least once a year. It discusses among other issues related to the state of the nation, the state of local governments and national unity. The Council’s resolutions shall be forwarded to the institutions and services concerned in order to improve the services rendered to the population.*

In practice, this is an annual meeting involving the President of the Republic of Rwanda Paul Kagame, government and civil society to discuss and find areas of work to solve the problems of the nation. In this sense, the Rwandan national dialogue Umushyikirano is a flexible form of participatory democracy. It may explain the remarkable dynamics experienced development for about two decades in Rwanda.

The various resolutions of the national dialogue have weighed down on the improvement of public services, increased direct investment in Rwanda, access to care for the poorest, the reformation of the agricultural sector to achieve food self-sufficiency and export, uniform teaching English, rural access to public services. However overall, government action has achieved these goals even if the civil society side, several issues remain to be resolved including the establishment of a strong democracy with greater openness and effectiveness of freedoms of democratic freedoms...

Politically, despite the perennial debate that exists around the limitation of the presidential term, the population's commitment to move towards consensus or dialogue must be welcomed. This is what can explain that today, about 4 million people signed a petition to support the amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution referring to the limitation of the presidential mandate. The reasons of such a petition would be related inter alia to the stability of the country and its economic performance that place now among the best performing countries in Africa. Indeed, the country recorded during the decade 2000-2010 a strong, rapid poverty reduction and, since 2005, a reduction of inequalities despite a sudden and significant drop in external aid from the middle of 2012. However, in the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda only has few natural resources and little developed industry.

Legally, too, the constitutional amendment must comply with Article 193 which defines the procedures for revision of any Article of the Constitution when the will of the

¹⁰ Fweley Diangitukwa, *La lointaine origine de la gouvernance en Afrique : l’arbre à palabres*, Governance Review was 2014. The mediators' role was to endorse the decisions emanating from the negotiations undertaken by the College of Traditional Leaders consisting of the heads of clans, lineages and villages chosen by the warring parties to restore peace.

sovereign people decides. Terms including the agreement of both Houses of Parliament, followed by the approval of the sovereign people through referendum. So, beyond the competence of deputies and senators, the popular will is also a fundamental element that gives every constitutional amendment, not only legality but legitimacy. In view of the above, it is possible to argue that Rwanda can we say tried to initiate a process of emergence and stabilization based on an inclusive approach to base an ongoing dialogue between the different segments of the company. This has allowed some researchers such as Edward Batte Sennoga and Amata Sangho Diabate to support today that *“Twenty years after the genocide, Rwanda may be regarded as an example of successful development. The unity and reconciliation have been strengthened, which promotes good governance in the medium term”*¹¹.

Rwanda is then a concrete example that demonstrates the long term, continual dialogue, based on a genuine multi-disciplinary approach can lead to emergence. This is to say that as an effective tool for conflict resolution, dialogue needs to be quickened, to be supported ... It must be constantly in order to support the dynamic concerns of the population. A dialogue should not camp only on questions of political dialogue, power-sharing... it must support other particular economic and social concerns. A political dialogue is struggling to provide meaningful results can be long contested by the population that can rise up against it at any time. As such, Congo may we be an example.

-The Congo and the national dialogue failed attempt

It must be said that the Great Lakes region is sunk by several crises but its leaders have always tried to resolve their differences through dialogue. The Congolese had the idea that intra-Congolese dialogue remains peaceful and honorable way out for the DRC. Thus, several dialogues or several consultation forums were held in Congo with a view to reaching a lasting peace.

Since its accession to democracy in 1990, the DRC has experienced several such political crises. These crises have often been subject to considerable losses, massive violations of human rights and population displacement. But it is an opportunity here to magnify the attitude of the Congolese authorities and all Congolese political actors as different crises have brought all stakeholders to the negotiation and dialogue. But these crises are very different from each other, it is the same negotiations.

The frameworks for dialogue used to establish the belligerents in the armed conflict: This is the case of direct negotiations between former President Mobutu and former rebel leader Laurent Désiré Kabila. This is also the case with several other negotiations, such as those held in Victoria Falls I and II, Lusaka via Pretoria, Durban, Port Louis, Nairobi, Windhoek, Dodoma, Sirte and Gaborone. These forms of dialogue have been criticized by the Congolese public opinion, which saw in them a kind of negotiation or simply sharing power. So that despite the involvement of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and / or the development community of Southern Africa (SADC), the terms the dialogue did not lead to expected results.

¹¹ Benjamin Abtan, Rwanda: Pour un dialogue des Mémoires, Albin Michel (4 April 2007)

By contrast, the Sovereign National Conference (CNS)¹² would have been a genuine framework for dialogue between Congolese. Held in 1990, it differs from other negotiations by its inclusiveness in addition to being a framework for discussion of issues of common interest. It was a real dialogue is to “best interests of the Congo”. The overall objective of the Sovereign Conference was to reduce the conflicts that emerge as a result of the opening of the country's transition to a multiparty system¹³ and the new democratic political institutions. Deterioration in the economic situation¹⁴ coupled with a genuine political crisis was characteristic of Congo 1990s.

The claim for the organization of a national conference was launched in Brussels by representatives of nine political parties of the opposition to President Mobutu's MPR, following his speech on April, 24th 1990 where he announced the opening of the country to multiparty system¹⁵. The conference took place over one and a half or the second half of 1990 to 1992, and was attended by delegates representing all segments of the population, all Zairian (Congo - Kinshasa) regions and diaspora.

As part of its proceedings, the Sovereign National Conference had an internal regulations, was structured around various committees, each responsible to examine a specific aspect of socio-political life of the country, plus a plenary to discuss the commissions' reports. It will have three major forces or groups of major players: the Presidential Movement, the Opposition (consolidated but not necessarily united in Sacred Union) and the Catholic Church.

Despite Mobutu's several choking attempts and the inconsistency of some political actors, sovereign conference has allowed the Congolese to talk to each other and formulate inclusive and participatory manner solutions to the various problems that constrain their country's development. The originality of the sovereign Conference is that it was done without any explicit external interference. Better, this conference gave birth to a Constitutional Act of the Transition, a draft constitution to be submitted to popular referendum. The conference would complete the legal status of the High Council of the Republic in lieu of Transitional Parliament or HCR-PT. Unfortunately, its achievements and resolutions will remain dead letters on a background of power supremacy crisis between Mobutu and the CNS. In fact, following the decision of

¹² Reconciling amicably both conflicting parties.

¹³ <http://www.jambonews.net/actualites/20110330-le-dialogue-inter-rwandais-hautement-inclusif-une-solutio/>
Nevertheless, we must recognize that social dialogue remains a major issue in Rwanda especially in the political field. Thus Faustin Twagiramungu, has the strong belief that the most appropriate solution to the Rwandan refugees issue in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), can only be achieved through a frank and direct dialogue between the Government of Kigali and the opposition political parties under the auspices of African countries and organizations concerned about the future of Rwanda politics and taking into account the urgent need for stability and security in the Great Lakes region. Faustin Twagiramungu, President of the CPC and former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Brussels, October 6, 2014

¹⁴ <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/265488/politique/revision-de-la-constitution-pour-un-3e-mandat-de-kagame-une-modification-autorisee-par-la-constitution-du-rwanda/>

¹⁵ See Perspectives économiques en Afrique, UNDP, 2015.

President Mobutu to suspend the CNS and its refusal to recognize and allow the implementation of resolutions and achievements of the CNS, the country will be plunged into a conflict transition.

The second Congo war was an armed conflict that took place within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), which began in 1998 and officially ended in 2002, it involved nine African countries, and about thirty groups armed, making it the largest war between states in the history of contemporary Africa.

The desire for dialogue outlived Mobutu because even after his fall, the dialogue is not broken. Laurent Désiré Kabila who took power in 1997 would face the second Congo war until his assassination in 2001. The second Congo war should be stopped by the Agreements Pretoria and Lusaka. Even later, in 2002, calls by civil society and leaders of religious confessions for an inclusive dialogue involving all the warring parties in armed conflict will resonate with President Joseph Kabila to organize a consultation national. This dialogue took place in Sun City (South Africa) from February 25 to April 17 2002. The result, after multiple paths, was a comprehensive and inclusive agreement to be signed April 21, 2003 by all delegates¹⁶. This agreement will have the advantage of providing the DRC of an agenda to enable the end of hostilities, the return to normal constitutional order, creating a Republican Army through the integration of the belligerent forces, national reconciliation, reunification of the administration, the organization of elections and the establishment of transitional institutions including government and parliament.

The Sun City agreement laid important acts because it allowed the establishment of a political transition and the end of the war, establishing a government led by a president and four vice presidents. Consensus as described in the text of the agreement was a central element of the agreement, in the sense that Article 17 calls for a consensual management of the transition period.

Despite these agreements, conflicts continue and others emerge. So, having realized the failure of the military option, President Joseph Kabila convened a Conference on peace, security and development in North Kivu and South Kivu from January 6 to 23 in 2008. result in an act of commitment signed by the representatives of the government, armed groups, the international community or the various commitments are made by the protagonists, including an immediate cease-fire, the military brewing or disarmament and reintegration civil, facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, the creation of a demilitarized zone and abstention to support national and foreign armed groups, presentation and promulgation of an amnesty law for acts of war and insurrectionary.

It also follows a national program, security, pacification, stabilization and reconstruction of the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. However, even implemented, failure is still notorious. Peace and security have always proven without evidence to the

¹⁶ Several African countries have subscribed in the scheme of National Conferences in the years 1990 to 1993. This is the case of Benin and Gabon in 1990, Congo, Niger, Mali, Togo and Zaire in 1991 and Chad in 1993.

populations of eastern DRC. Difficulties in coordinating the efforts of each other between the initiators and divergent political and economic interests have taken over and peace is unfortunately ineffective and in 2012 the return of war is noted. Several other negotiations and agreements were made but were not ultimately successful.

Following multiple attacks and multiple dialogues, it must be stressed that the country's political situation evolves in a saw-tooth way particularly following the elections. The presidential elections held in November 2011, for example, came under an ineffable climate, marred sometimes deadly violence, irregularities and fraud proven. This led ipso facto legitimacy crisis of institutions.

At the time these lines are about to be written, the national dialogue is to be an actuality in Congo since the military option has revealed its failures. Even if the dialogue is not yet very successful, it continues to be the only way out even if the method has to change. The ultimate goals of the Congolese national dialogue should be legitimizing and strengthening of republican institutions. Dialogue should not be synonymous with sharing power but democratization of power. Accession to the latter can be done through free elections, transparent and credible. Impunity should no longer be tolerated. The resolutions resulting from dialogue frameworks must be binding and enforceable. The dialogue participants must be responsible and gifted in good faith. What about the dialogue in Burundi?

-The Burundi revives the demons of division

The political history of Burundi is abusive. From 1962, date of independence to date, Burundi has not experienced a respite: The massacres of May-June 1972 and those of October 1993 following the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically elected President, killed three months after his swearing and his investiture by a small group of extremists in the army, for long the bereaved countries. For out of the spiral of violence in which he is established, several attempts were carried out. Among the most important: the inter-Burundian dialogue held between the 15 and 18 May 1994 and straight fits a symposium held in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 1993 on the restoration of peace and the democratic process in Burundi.

The Geneva Symposium in fact opened the way for a genuine dialogue between Burundians since we could, within one year after the coup and the assassination of President Ndadaye, Hutu and Tutsi together around a table for a primer reconciliation. The symposium's conclusions called for a meeting of the same type to be held in Bujumbura which would involve more Burundians actors. Indeed, the meeting held in July 1994 in Bujumbura had met in a frank and open dialogue, for the first time representatives of the government, political parties, members of the armed forces and civil society. For the first time Burundians were able to experience a sometimes very heated public exchange between civilian and military who were forced for the first time to face the harshest critics from civil society.

The meeting inter-Burundian identified four important points:

1. national dialogue is the only effective means of resolving the country's political crises;
2. the national army must become an institution that enjoys the confidence of the entire

population;

3. we must strengthen the judicial system to be independent. The Conference strongly recommends that all those who committed crimes against humanity are brought to justice;

4. we need to strengthen democratic institutions and promote political pluralism. And presidential candidate must provide assurance of loyalty to the Constitution.

The national dialogue started and will continue four months later and will conclude with the signature in September 10, 1994 of a government agreement between eight opposition parties and the parties of the ruling coalition.

Despite all these efforts, Burundi remained fragile. The dialogue between the opposition and the government does not happen smoothly. The weapons are circulating, young people are exploited and suspicion and fear tend to be the rule of "Modus Vivendi". The September 30, 1994, during his inaugural speech President Ntibantunganya described the situation of the country in these terms:

Indeed, peace and security have been seriously tested in the country. Illegal weapons have increased in the population. Militias in the pay of some politicians or criminal gangs are in the process of sowing desolation in Burundi. The murder became the watchword among some young people to make a Bravery item. There are even politicians who, without shame nor cold eyes, scream loudly in stadiums or in conferences with national or foreign journalists in Burundi that salvation can be found only through and by means of the war....

What is unfortunate in all this is that these people without faith use our youth. There are young people who have dropped out of school to engage in war. Currently it is they who make up these groups you hear about. These are those called: Intagoheka. "The fierce implacable who do not sleep," the SOJEDEM "Youth Solidarity for the Defence of Minority Rights", the "Sans Failed" and "No-Loss"¹⁷

The situation described by the president was right Ntibantunganya national dialogue. The Burundi revives the violence. To break the cycle of violence, it was not a man: Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela whose mediation led to the Arusha Accords, the name of a Tanzanian city were sealed in 2000, the founding principles of peace in Burundi . The agreements signed in Arusha come into force in November 1st, 2001 providing among others a transition period of 3 years headed for the first 18 months, by Major Pierre Buyoya as president and Domitien Ndayizeye as vice-president. Pierre Buyoya respected

¹⁷ Among the difficulties, we can note an increased climate of violence and insecurity of the population through kidnappings, murders and properties destruction; systematic looting of business premises and the ransacking of public buildings and economic infrastructure; the intensification of the repression against the press and against the population (eg, walking with hope for peace in February 1992); the resurgence of ethnic conflict (eg, the Kasaïans in Shaba in 1992, Masisi and Walikale Among the difficulties, we can note an increased climate of violence and insecurity of the population through kidnappings, murders and destruction of properties; systematic looting of business premises and the ransacking of public buildings and economic infrastructure; the intensification of the repression against the press and against the population (eg, walking with hope for peace in February 1992); the resurgence of ethnic conflict (eg, the Kasaïans in Shaba in 1992, Masisi and Walikale in North Kivu in 1993); the deteriorating economic situation; the collapse of the central state and an acceleration of the country's state of decay; Stalled process of transition

alternation and would leave his post in time expired. South Africa would send 700 soldiers to ensure the monitoring of the Arusha Accords.

The news reaching us from Burundi are not as fun: assassinations, intimidation, imprisonment, etc. thus helping to anchor more instability in the Great Lakes area already well established for decades in serious crises. Even today there are voices to ask the international community to once again involve in Burundi to resume the dialogue, enforce the Arusha Accords and put the country on the path of reconciliation. Until arises a mediator of Nelson Mandela's calibre, murders multiply, intimidation continues. Dialogue is moving further and further away every day. Will the international community arrive in time?

B / National dialogue in Central Africa: Tchad

Rocked by years of instability, Chad is a country that has a rather hectic political history. The coups, rebel movements, crises with neighboring countries (notably Libya and Sudan where it is possible to see the same ethnic groups from either side of the borders.) and fratricidal wars mark the contemporary history of Chad as currently noticed in the horrible tragedies that come out of the testimonies of victims of Hissène Habré trial in progress. Poor governance, corruption, violations of human rights, the unilateral change of the constitution and mismanagement of oil revenues have made Chad one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. Yet several agreements were initiated to leave Chad of its situation. This is the case of the Dakar Agreement, the Sirte Agreement of four rebel groups and the Chadian government, and the agreement of August 13, 2007 regarding electoral reforms.

Similarly, in the wake of the political crisis caused by the constitutional revision of 2005, which allowed Deby president to appear before voters for a third term in 2006, the international community (France, EU and IOF) supported the inter-Chadian political dialogue under the “political agreement for the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad,” concluded in August 13, 2007. This process allowed the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2011 under the supervision of the Commission independent National Electoral (INEC). Local elections (the first in the country's history) were held in January 22, 2012, in 42 municipalities. The agreement signed with Sudan in January 15, 2010 terminated the cross support to the rebellion that threatened both countries.

These various examples above show that many initiatives have been undertaken to achieve stability. But such a comprehensive national dialogue holds our attention, namely the Chad sovereign national conference which held its foundations in Ndjamena in 1993. The conference lasted three months and was described by a Dutch expert as the “feast of democracy¹⁸. This means that the Conference had harbored much hope. Chadians thought it would be an opportunity for them to leave permanently from the long period of civil war and enter the era of democracy and peace.

Important decisions were made anyway at the end of the Conference:

¹⁸ Inflation statements 7000% in 1992. S. Table de concertation sur les droits humains au Zaïre, 1996, p. 30

1. Legitimacy of the President of the Republic powers, as the first transitional body;
2. Election of a transitional Prime Minister, in the person of Dr. Fidel Mounzar;
3. Election of a transitional parliament, called the Higher Transitional Council (CST) composed-of-60-members;
4. Adoption of a "National Transitional Charter" in lieu thereof;
5. Adoption of a specification, a political action plan that the transitional government had to apply during the transitional period limited to one year, but with possibility of extension.

Unfortunately, since the implementation of these recommendations is hardly effective. The opposition between the President of transition and his prime minister did not facilitate efficient especially as the President of the transition had to change twice Prime Minister and even a Minister of Finance, for reasons supposed personal. Even the subsequent elections later seem to be very criticized and until today the democratic environment in the country is challenged by several international NGOs.

In 2006 alone, civil society has made an urgent appeal to the usefulness of a dialogue. The urgency was such that one of the Call Monitoring Committee for Peace and Reconciliation has been set up but it was noted here and there, a categorical refusal to allow the establishment of national dialogue as proposed by civil society. According to an exiled Chad opponent, there is no inclusive dialogue in Chad but exclusive dialogue with Khartoum. *The Chad and Sudan Heads of State have agreed according to their interests and they neglected their own reconciliation with opponents, thinking this way to deal with crises in our countries.*

So, to our knowledge, beyond the national conference whose implementation can be considered a failure, there is no more, another truly global and inclusive dialogue in Chad. Yet the Chadian history has shown that piecemeal agreements were not the solution. Although it's been relatively stable now, there were rebellions and agreements and those agreements have often resulted in assassinations than through sharing positions. So these piecemeal agreements contributed only worsen the situation in Chad.

Several other reasons justifying the need for a general consultation. First, at the time of the implementation of Habré Hissaine Trial that will recall Chadians their past, the national dialogue becomes all the more necessary that justice must always give way to reconciliation that can be effective only if it is preceded by a participatory dialogue.

Then, the 2016 elections are a crucial issue in substantive tensions. Like any election in Africa, that of Chad is a challenge for peace and national stability¹⁹. To recall, President Deby has spent 24 years in power and had amended the Constitution in 2005 to lift term limits, if this trend is repeated, there can be serious consequences on the country's stability. On this plan, Burkina Faso may serve as a textbook case.

¹⁹ DE Villers, G. and J. Omasombo Tshonda, « Zaïre. La transition manquée (1990-1997) », Cahiers Africains, No. 27-28-29, African Institute, CEDAF 1997.

Finally, faced with security challenges and terrorism that threaten the area especially with "BokkoHaram" attacks building a national pact between the different components of the opposition and the current powers, internally becomes a necessity.

Elsewhere in West Africa too, we also tested the national dialogue as a conflict resolution mechanism but in the case of Ivory Coast, we would say as a national reconciliation mechanism.

III / The Dialogue as a tool for conflict resolution in West Africa

Africa in general and West Africa in particular is plagued by multiple social crises, economic and political since the waves of democratization in the 1990.

A /The Senegalese experience of the national dialogue

Otherwise, Senegal can claim to be an exception to a certain extent since it has never experienced a coup so that the constitutionalist lawyer, Prof. Ismaila Major denotes that our country is an *"island of stability in an unstable ocean."* Senegal is a country that has an old democratic tradition based on dialogue, peace and cooperation²⁰. The example of Senegal deserves to be noted²¹. It is pertinent to note that apart multiple reasons for pacification of the country, we still have to focus on the tradition of dialogue that is rooted in the Senegalese culture. At all times when the situation seemed very dangerous, political, religious and traditional authorities call for Dialogue has always shown its benefits. Where weapons have failed elsewhere in Africa, a sincere and frank dialogue could resolve the tensions in the country of Teranga. The most typical example is probably that very recently gave birth to the national conference.

B / Ivory Coast where the challenges of national reconciliation

About the Ivorian case, it must be remembered simply the violent situation in the country following the presidential election in 2010. Alassane Ouattara was elected President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire but the outgoing President, Laurent Gbagbo stubbornly refuses to leave power. Then followed a very deadly crisis that will last six months, and will make 3,000 deaths and many wounded. Both sides violently opposed but fortunately after taking actual power, President Ouattara decided to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to promote dialogue between Ivorian. Section 5 of the Order described the Commission's mission²²:

- "To work independently to reconciliation and the strengthening of social cohesion between all the communities living in Ivory Coast." Under this article, the CDVR shall:
- Develop an appropriate typology of violations of human rights; to seek the truth and determine responsibility on national socio-political events past and recent;
- Hear victims obtain recognition of the facts by the authors of the breaches alleged and subsequent forgiveness ; propose the means of any kind might contribute to healing the

²⁰ Ndeye Tountou Diakite, National Report on Senegal: industrial relations, CSA, 2009

²¹ Tension rose in the workplace. But the government wants to make social dialogue the foundation of its action, "said Mr. Sy, during a press conference available on http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/le-gouvernement-senegalais-veut-to-du_n_116350.html visited September 15, 2015.

²² See section 5 of Ordinance No. 2011-167 of 13 July 2011 on the establishment, responsibilities, organization and functioning of the Truth and Reconciliation Dialogue Committee

trauma-suffered-by-the-victims;

- Identify and make proposals to fight against injustice, inequality of any kind, exclusion and hatred in all their forms; educate to peace; to contribute to the emergence of a national consciousness and membership of all, and to promote respect for diversity and democratic-values.

This section 5 is often considered very ambitious. Then the order which gave rise to this commission has not defined its period of jurisdiction. Yet we know that Côte d'Ivoire has experienced two major crises namely that of 2010 and above that which arises from the failed coup in September 2002 and which led to the partition of the country in two for almost-a-decade.

Beyond this text Ivorian commission was also criticized because while people thought that all political actors should be involved in the process, Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other members of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) were concerned. What makes people thought he had to negotiate directly with the regime in place rather than rely on the reconciliation commission. This issue must be remembered, returns regularly because it is related to the same dialectic between justice and peace. Should we focus on reconciliation and dialogue, or should it begin-with-justice-and-what-justice?

Another limitation of the Ivorian reconciliation Commission is related to the fact that the President was from the very beginning disputed. Charles Konan Banny was responsible for leading the institution when it was a politician member of the PDCI party belonging himself to the coalition that allowed the victory of Alassane Ouattara in 2010, the gathering of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP) However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Côte d'Ivoire had the merit of associating through the three vice-presidents of important branches of the company (religion and tradition). The stated objective was to set up an executive committee composed of representatives of the main religions that are found in Ivory Coast, but also traditional chiefs. Indeed, religious and traditional leaders are often perceived as neutral personalities, wise, very close to the people and therefore able to distill a message of peace. In doing so, Désiré Tanoé Amon, king of N'zima Kotoko and Cheick Boikary Fofana, president of the Superior Council of Imams (COSIM) were appointed first and second vice-presidents respectively. The post of Third Vice-President was occupied by Bishop Paul Ahouana Simeon, Metropolitan Archbishop of Bouaké. Always to cite its advantages, we should note the representation of all major regions. The CDVR has acquired seven central commissioners to represent the five major regions of Côte d'Ivoire namely North, South, West, East and the Centre, but also African and non-African residents as well as the Ivorian diaspora. In the same vein, the CDVR expanded its activities in 2013 through the Ivory Coast in establishing thirty local commissions under the supervision of the central Commissioners. Favoring consultative and participatory approach, these local commissions were to contribute to the awareness of citizens and local communities to organize community dialogue and inter-community, but especially to obtain the testimony of the victims in order to establish bases regional and local data.

For public meetings, it was announced that they would gather the "perpetrators" and victims as part of a "dramatization" likely "to participate in psychological redress for

violations²³. This was a very good initiative, even though the implementation was not complete.

This first commission completed its mandate after three years, precisely December 15, 2014 and officially submitted its final Report to the President of the Republic Alassane Ouattara. According to the commission, the past three years, about 72 483 victims were interviewed, including 28,064 women and 757 children²⁴. Among others, Charles Konan Banny has recommended the establishment of "national days of memory and forgiveness" as well as "days dedicated to dialogue." To complete its mandate, a new National Reconciliation Commission and compensation for victims was created by Mr. Ouattara, March 25, 2015. Its objective is the compensation for victims. For that matter, it will be funded of 10 billion CFA francs. However, we must recognize that in the end, the first commission had some limitations and shares of unfinished business. According to the research group and information on peace²⁵, "*Overly ambitious and misunderstood attributions of the people and an inability to translate into concrete political speeches advocating the need for gathering seem not to have allowed this institution to carry out the mission which was his, namely work towards reconciliation and strengthening social cohesion*"²⁶. This means while the materialization of speech heralds of reconciliation through concrete policies is overdue. Similarly, neither the final report of the CDVR or transcripts of meetings of the perpetrators and victims have been made public by the government in power.

Nevertheless, we must recognize that the peace process in the Ivory Coast is in the process of giving these fruits as shown in the last presidential election of October 25, when the outgoing President was virtually 83% of the vote. Only it is important to state that this commission was not the only body which dealt dialogue and reconciliation. Various actors have contributed to what may be called the moment a reconciliation process.

The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the Search For Common Ground (SFCG), Pan-African networks such as the West African Network For Peacebuilding (WANEP), but also on local players such as the Centre for Research and Action for Peace (CERAP) actually participated in this search for peace through dialogue. This juxtaposition of actions was likely to promote an atmosphere of peace. What about Mali?

C / The national dialogue, a tool more than necessary for a definitive stability in Mali

With an area of 1,241,231 km² and a population estimated at nearly 14 million in 2009, Mali is a multiethnic country. The Bambara, Malinke, Soninke represent 50% of the total population, followed by the Peuhl, or Fulani, 13% of people of Burkinabé origin, either Gur, either Mande (12%), Tuaregs and Moors (10%) Songhai (6%) and finally people of other-ethnic-groups-(5%)²⁷.

²³ Website of CDVR.

²⁴ Website of CDVR

²⁵ The Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) is an independent research center founded in Brussels in 1979.

²⁶ Daniel Lopes, "analytical note" GRIP, 2015.

²⁷ Report No. 44459-ML Mali The demographic challenge, June 30, 2009

The Tuareg nomads are essentially found in the north. However, due to uneven development, the south remains more developed than the north. Despite efforts of the government, some groups in the north, including the Tuareg and Arabs feel they are victims due to socio-spatial segregation from the central government. However, it is interesting to note that the premises of the Tuareg rebellion date back from the time of the draft Common Organisation of Saharan Regions (OCRS). This project aimed to detach a part of the territorial areas of Algeria, the French Sudan, Niger and Chad to benefit the colonial power. These renowned mineral-rich areas precisely corresponded to the space occupied by the Tuaregs. The amputation project Sudan to benefit the OCRS was withdrawn before the firm opposition of the Sudanese party. But that project had already sown the seeds of division. In doing so, the independent Mali has experienced several-rebellions-movements²⁸.

The Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA) was established in 1988 in Libya. Will follow several attacks by said group: the attack on the prison and garrison Menaka and Tchintabaradene attack that took place in June and in May 1990. The army responded with military operations in the north, especially around Gao in July and August 1990. Despite a peace agreement brokered by Algeria in Tamanrasset in 1991, violence continues.

After taking power in 1991 by AmadiToumani Touré, a national conference was held in Bamako in view to the Mali on the rails of democracy. And 12 January 1992, a new constitution was adopted. Mr Konaré and won the first multiparty elections in Mali. The management of these rebellions movements became one of the priorities of the new state authorities working for the maintenance of stability and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, a national pact which establishes the special status of regions north of Mali was established in 1992. The pact aimed to reach a negotiated peaceful, just and definitive plugging the 6th, 7th and 8th regions the Republic of Mali called Azawad. This solution was trying to take into account cultural, geographical and socio-economic differences-that-exist-in-the-Republic-of-Mali.

Title III of the Covenant addresses the question of the special status accorded to regions north of Mali. Broad autonomy is planned for the northern regions of Mali through local, regional and interregional that are interregional Assembly, the region, the town, the district-and-circle.

Title IV deals with the problem of solidarity and national unity in northern Mali. It plans *“integration under the framework of special movements of populations and people of northern Mali in the central bodies of the General Staff of National Defense and other security forces”* (Subtitle B , 52). As well as their integration into the different bodies of the-public-and-Para-public-administration.

Title V talks about regional and international cooperation under Title VI and sets the implementation calendar of the Covenant of national reconciliation and the establishment of a Commissioner in the North to the Republic Presidency. However, what most interests us in the adoption of this pact is the method used by the parties to achieve this. This will to move toward peace through negotiations should be welcomed. Moreover, it appears from the preamble to the agreement where it reads: "at

²⁸ Two major rebellions, Tuareg and Arabic, one in 1963 and another in 1990. A third crisis broke out in the same area in 2009.

the end of their peace negotiations in Algiers, under the mediation of the Algerian republic", the parties agree as follows. The parties seem to overshadow the traditional approach to resolving the conflict by military force involving national civil society and political parties in the discussions. The national pact is the result of a long process of mediation and negotiations that led to compromises on several components: the integration of former rebels in the public services (uniformed and general administration) and in social activities -economic; easing the military presence in the North; the return of the administration and technical services in the North; the resumption of economic activities and the implementation of socio-economic development programs for the major medium and long term; the return of refugees; the implementation-of-the-decentralization-program.

Thus, in 2390 former combatants across all movements were integrated into the body by state uniform and 150 of the Civil Service. The other fighters to the number of unintegrated 9511, they received a first Socio-Economic Reintegration program in grants for the creation of micro and currently a form of microcredit Consolidation Program and assistance in the creation of medium-sized companies through a bank guarantee mechanism. Today, returning refugees and resettled IDPs benefit from ongoing development program in their areas increasingly integrated into socio-economic-programs-of-the-new-municipalities.

The last part, dedicated to the economic development of northern regions focused on macro and micro social and economic programs Insertion north of vulnerable populations-with-special-emphasis-on-rural-youth.

For Zeidan Ag Sidalamine, former Coordinator of the Movements and unified fronts of Azawad (MFUA), the National Pact is one of the better deals in the sub-region that inspired many torn nations on the continent²⁹. He continues to show his disagreement during the last rebellion in 2012 by hammering: *"I condemn any resort to armed violence wherever it comes from and whatever its signing of respect to my moral and political commitments contained in the Covenant of April 11, 1992, in Bourem agreements of January 11, 1995 with the GandhaKoy. Commitments included in the self-affirmation dissolution of movements and fronts unified Azawad and Mali GandhaKoy Patriotic Movement of 27 March 1996 in Timbuktu"*, says the now former spokesman of the National Pact and the Flame of Peace . So from the point of view of many observers, the National Pact had already identified all the problems. The gains were also recorded in three dimensions: the security dimension resulted in the integration of the combatants of MFUA in government forces and the Malian government. The institutional dimension corresponding to the implementation of decentralization and the socio-economic dimension related to the repatriation of refugee populations and their reintegration as well as demobilized combatants. So, both the method on the results, the National Pact can be an example to illustrate that a dialogue can bear fruit that can ensure stability. Moreover, the uniqueness of this pact

²⁹ Zeidan Ag Sidalamine, former coordinating movements and fronts unified Azawad, was directing in the past field operations. He was also general secretary of People's Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLAs) and successively advisor to regional business and affairs and decentralization of Presidents Alpha Oumar Konaré and Amadou Toumani Touré from September 1998 to January 2003 and from February 2012, technical Advisor to the General Secretariat of Presidency of the Republic.V.<http://maliactu.net/zeidan-ag-sidalamine-ex-coordonnateur-du-mfua-le-pacte-national-est-lun-des-meilleurs-accords-de-la-sous-region/>

pushed Odile Hardy, author, to describe it in his book as an original solution³⁰. Better, the peace process initiated by the pact, consolidates and results in the flame of peace ceremony, March 27, 1996 in Timbuktu, in which are symbolically destroyed 3000 weapons of rebellion. An amnesty law was passed in 1997 by the Parliament of Mali. However, it must be recognized that despite its richness in content, its participatory nature and coherence, the National Pact of the agreements have not calmed the situation in the North. The creation of new rebel groups from the bursting of the MPA, does not help matters. Renewed tension was noted in 2006 and 2007. This led respectively to the Algiers Accords in 2006 and the peace agreement reached in Libya in 2009. However, to our knowledge, the actual rebellion resumed January 17, 2012. She was helped by the return of hundreds of Tuareg members of the legion of Gaddafi and the spread of Libyan arms. The country's situation is getting worse because the 21 and 22 March 2012, in addition to the armed rebellion in the north of the country, a military mutiny outweighs the regime of Amadou Toumani Toure. To help Mali out of the crisis, a framework agreement was signed on April 6 by the junta and ECOWAS to implement a political transition. In this context, Traore, President of the National Assembly designated 12 April as interim President of the Republic of Mali, Cheick Modibo Diarra and transitional Prime Minister. A second agreement was concluded between the May 20 coup, the transitional authorities and ECOWAS to extend this transition for a year as of May 22 on 6 April 2012, the MNLA unilaterally proclaimed the "independence of Azawad". Northern Mali is then occupied by Islamist terrorist groups who impose their terrible law: AQIM and MUJAO, joined by Ansar Dine Islamist opposed Tuareg MNLA movement³¹.

This means that today, the construction of peace in northern Mali continues to be a long and difficult process fraught with pitfalls, with ups and downs. The consensual peace that existed was the result of a combination of factors and assets: social, cultural (culture, societal values, the virtues of dialogue, consensus, peace, persuasion), political (the democratic opening). But the historical turning point was the change in approach to the issue of Northern initiated under the aegis of the National Pact. Several mechanisms were experienced in research and peacebuilding. These mechanisms have borne fruit to such an extent that in a research conducted by the French Senate, it is clearly mentioned that Mali, to get out, must rebuild its national pact³².

However, it should be noted that it is difficult to reach a definitive peace as the interests of each other (neighboring countries, Western countries, Arab countries, rebel groups, the Malian state, etc.) are divergent and often antagonistic. Added to this, the change of the deal with the narco traffickers, traders or sellers of hostages, armed bandits, traffickers of migrants, terrorist movements encouraged by the Libyan-crisis-(Al-Qaeda-of-the-Islamic-Maghreb).

Only in the light of research conducted by an NGO and based on focus groups, solutions to improve social relations in Mali, must be made at the community level and be anchored in the dialogue. Gather around the same table to talk and look into their eyes,

³⁰ V. Odile Hardy, "Tuareg of Mali: the National Pact, an original solution," Spirit, 1992. Pp 183-188.

³¹ V. <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-513/r12-5134.html>

³² V. <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r12-513/r12-5134.html>

sharing a cup of tea, start a simple and direct dialogue appear as actions that, in the eyes of the surveyed communities, can guarantee true reconciliation.

D / Benin and the experience of a collective action for a “soft» political transition

Whatever the criticisms that one can wear today the Beninese political system, it is to admit, however, that Benin is successful peaceful transition model figure. It has taken place in this country a soft passage from a military-Marxist regime to a presidential system. Collective action that allowed the transition in Benin was born in pain. Indeed, in the late 1980s, the Beninese government could not pay any salaries or pensions or scholarships.

Everything stopped, the country was paralyzed. More seriously, the state in his panic suppressed indiscriminately. It is this situation that Richard Adjaho, Minister of Finance and Inspector of her condition described as follows:

"For many years, from 1960 to 1972, the State of Benin has used the balanced budget subsidies from the French State to complete his income. Under the "revolutionary" regime, the period from 1972 to 1975 coincided with the previous imbalances stabilization phase. From 1975, the party regime of the People's Revolution of Benin knew a balance between revenue and expenditure. This balanced budget has even strengthened until 1982 at the point of surpluses may fictitious some years, without the mark made on behalf of management. But because of the total lack of proper control over revenue and expenditure of the State because of a disorderly and irresponsible management of public funds, and especially because of unreliable and risky investments, the financial position of Benin State deteriorated rapidly, initiating in 1983 already, the descent into hell. True to its suicidal logic of widespread corruption and artisanal management of state finances, the PRPB government knew nothing, nor could actually take any action to stabilize and recover compromised its financial position. So drowned under all kinds of imbalances, economic, financial imbalances, cash with the bankruptcy of almost all public enterprises, the bankruptcy of the entire banking system and under the influence of bankruptcy that forced and forced the state has signed the first program of the Structural Adjustment Benin in June 1989³³. "

For blowing cool wind and have a little respite attempts were made to renew the Revolutionary National Assembly. The disinterest of voters showed the depth of the gulf between people power. It took the strength of character and wisdom of two men, two representatives from higher education to the third legislature to prevent the country from descending into chaos. By meeting with President Kerekou these newcomers trying to engage the power on the reformist path and will play an important role in the regime change process. To pass the desired change, the organizers of the National Conference had set a goal to bring all social structures to freely engage in the new social project: former presidents and traditional and religious authorities, trade unionists, Beninese from outside the university, economic operators, professional associations as well as development associations, NGOs and members of the armed forces. 493 delegates for the national conference thus constituted would throw them out of the crisis databases. The constitution "Marxist-Leninist 1972 is suspended and the drafting

³³ Richard Adjaho, Bankruptcy Control of Public Finance in Benin (1960 to 1990). Publishing Flamboyant, Cotonou, 1992, page 15.

of a new constitution to be submitted to referendum is entrusted to lawyers, although kept at his post, the head of the state's powers are limited, the portfolio defense is withdrawn. Transitional institutions are in place. A prime minister told Nicephore Soglo is created and a legislative body, the High Council of the Republic composed of 13 members of the Presidium of the conference, former presidents of the republic, the three committee chairmen (constitutional, economic and cultural), delegates from six provinces and 25 elected members. Decisions of considerable significance. The establishment of the institutions by the people offers the opportunity to the people to appropriate them. These retrospective few lines of the approach that led to the new order in Benin is on the one hand, to meet the inclusive nature of the dialogue that has allowed Benin to make the transition, but also to present the tensions that arise from challenges and illusions that one can do when you began this exercise, on the other. National conferences wherever they have occurred had the merit inclusion in all social process, including traditional authorities - traditional leaders - that decolonization had vassalized and independence were reduced to their simplest expression. The problem is the management of the assets of the national conference, including collective mobilization that produced the new system.

Dialogue is an exercise in tolerance and openness to the other in order to find together, the confrontation of different positions, even antagonistic, truth or the solution to the problem.

In the case of Benin before us several ideas of the dialogue approach clash: for President Kerekou, the national conference was simply a framework for expressing grievances, to outline a new economic program to develop a new social contract with the few key political reforms. But for delegates, it was the foundation of a new Beninese society whose operation would remove Kerekou himself from power. The process resulted in Benin to political pluralism and facilitated the emergence of a new class of men and women in politics and civil society organizations whose actors have become key elements of political change. These democratic gains have allowed the election in 2006 as head of state after a personality of civil society by breaking this state of the monopoly of political parties. This is Boni Yayi, the current President of the Republic of Benin. To register for the achievements of the national dialogue "Active Forces of the Nation", capping the number of terms, a provision of the constitution.

In Benin, the establishment of quotas for corporation has made it difficult to start the national conference. The project reserved an important place in government, at the meeting, the military and PRPB who obtained five seats against two other political formations. In January-February 1990, a new dynamic of mobilization snaps that pushes the authorities to amend the quotas: the representation of PRPB is revised down, but power is still guaranteed a large majority through organizations acquired its cause. Weary of war, trade unions and opposition parties are implementing the strategy of poaching by secret negotiations and thus obtained the rallying of other organizations, including farmers in their causes. Thus, according to the positions and interests of each other, new political sensibilities are formed. For unions and opposition political parties, restoring the balance of power demanded this. But this posed a fundamental problem for the continuation of national dialogue. When a group leaves the peasant section to join a political party on behalf of which he speaks? How to open a discussion or establish

a compromise between parties whose identities fluctuate? While the Organizing Committee sought to resolve the issue of representativeness, a climate of extreme tension and uncertainty surrounding the national conference; Street continued to rumble: the opposition continued its mobilization and created a front of four major parties; strikes continued and reached all sectors. And throughout the conference the country will live on the brink of collapse. Without determining Monsignor Da Souza and commitment of the people, the National Conference would have been a different outcome.

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Dossou, one of the main instigators and protagonists in the national conference summed up the whole process as follows: The idea of National Conference of Active Forces in Benin is the product of a national consensus. The political power has taken the initiative. The people acceded while remaining on guard. But each difficulty, each power as people threw ballast and made concessions.

The idea of National Conference of Active Forces in Benin is the product of a national consensus. The political power has taken the initiative. The people acceded while remaining on guard. But each difficulty, each power as people made concessions. An essential element of this appeasement during the Conference and during the transition and even after the transition was Monsignor Isidore de Souza. It is these concessions and the constant mediation of the President of the High Council of the Republic who have made the success of the National Conference in Benin. This has distinguished experience itself in many respects to the Guinean experience.

E / The Guinea and experiences of dialogue as conflict prevention and management tool

The political history of Guinea remains marked by violence and massive violations of human rights perpetrated by the various regimes that have held power. Defense and security forces, armed wings of powers, were one of the fundamental causes of the fragile political stability, the country's social and economic. For many years, the security sector has been subject to no control and contributed to the ongoing instability in the country. At one point, the sector is in a state of decay characterized by structural and functional disorganization, poor financial management, uncontrolled overstuffed and poorly disciplined, lack of civilian control, judicial and parliamentary, opacity in resources management and lack of capacity to provide useful services to the population. The trust between the population and the defense and security forces are greatly affected.

At the institutional situation and internal policy adds an unstable environment: on its southern flank, as are its neighbors Sierra Leone and Liberia have experienced in the 1990s atrocious civil wars whose direct consequence is considerable pressure on natural resources and a huge challenge to keep a balance for a largely unstable country with its history. Indeed, between 1989 and 2002, Guinea has hosted over 200,000 refugees Sierra - Leoneans and Liberians fleeing the ravages prevailing in their countries. The most devastating effect of the socio-political balance of Guinean during conflicts in Sierra - Leone and Liberia, was no doubt the military involvement in the fighting, because of the many raids, conducted by both the Regular Army as by rebellions

in Guinean territory: first have evoked the obligation of prosecution and the second have used it as a fallback basis. A situation that fostered a considerable circulation of small arms on Guinean soil and led to the formation of armed groups with each other will serve as militias in the struggle for power in Conakry.

The Northwest of Guinea-Bissau, in an almost permanent crisis, was often suspected by Guinea of harboring mercenaries trying to destabilize the power in Conakry. But contrary to what one would think Guinea on the brink economically, socio-politically and in the security level, never really switched into a civil war. How come? Who are the sons that prevent Guinea from falling? It appears in the sociocultural history of Guinea lively dialogue frameworks by people whose primary role was and still is to renew dialogue son whenever the need arises. These are also called griots³⁴, People of speech, religious and traditional leaders as well as women, even if (it should be noted) are often due to cultural constraints, actresses shade. In Guinea, better than elsewhere, the traditional structures to prevent and manage conflicts remained intact. For the purposes of this report we will look at different approaches to dialogue restarting. For the specific case of Guinea, we especially interesting the approaches embodied by traditional structures in which we find the griots, the council of elders and the religious leaders, but also those more modern that use other types mechanisms carried by other types actors. However, sometimes we mix in a modern approach called two-structures-for-effective-action.

Traditional structures are lively dialogue and mediation by the council of wises and religious and traditional leaders receiving an implicit mandate conferred by their status to-play-an-intermediary-role-in-conflicts.

On traditional mechanisms, it should be noted that mediation in traditional environment aimed at finding a settlement agreement, often more durable and do not affect the social fabric. Almost every element of the tradition can be used for prevention and conflict management. Dialogue approaches are chosen by those undertaking the process according to the context, situation and cultural background of the protagonists. Generally, those who undertake to renew dialogue son adopt the following approach:

- When the mediators arrive in the locality affected by the conflict, they turn first to the administrative and traditional authorities to explain their reason for their visit and solicit-their-support.

- Then they conduct a survey of the Elders of the community, administrative authorities and others to check the veracity of the various claims.

- Once they have made a clear picture of the causes of conflict and especially the possibilities of peace, the wise call a meeting with all parties concerned. Before getting into the thick of it, the wise men remind people the desirability to live in peace in a community and to try to resolve differences with the tools bequeathed by the ancestors. After these remarks, the floor is given to each party. The version of the facts we listen carefully to the mouth of each of the protagonists and witnesses. Then it was the turn of the notables of the area to speak. Notable for their speaking has

³⁴ Sory Camara. People of speech. Essay on the status and role of the griots in Malinke society, Paris, Karthala, 1992, 375 p.

no other purpose than to make their position relative to the various statements. One way to declare himself neutral in the conflict.

The persons responsible for resolving the conflict referring to the ties ancestors and religious values will deliver the verdict by ensuring that no one feels humiliated. These structures exist in all regions and as a net spread their knowledge and expertise on the whole Guinean territory. They solve communal conflicts, political, ethnic, communal, religious, etc. This means that they are deployed in all spheres of Guinean society-to-renew-dialogue.

Political life in Guinea is punctuated by violence certainly, but also by attempts to renew contacts for a peaceful social climate. These steps are the work of various goodwill whether from traditional structures or the political environment. The latest (presidential elections in October 2015 requires) aimed to defuse the political scene in the country and avoid the violence that courses in every election organized in Guinea. Dialogues were political and therefore not so concerned that the opposition and the ruling-regime.

In 2010, the assessment of the security sector by a joint mission of ECOWAS, AU and UN has highlighted the deficit of governance Defense Forces, the absence of civil and democratic control, the inadequacy of the tool against the new threats, the weak integration of the gender dimension, the magnitude of the uncontrolled circulation of small arms, the non-respect of human rights by some men in uniform, aging and insufficient-staff,-etc.

Safety being a cross-sector concerning the entire population for its well-being and socio-economic development, it was necessary and imperative to involve civil society and reflection must include all of Guinean society. The work of reform englobe then the civil society both to contribute to the formulation of public security policies and their implementation. It was indeed, as so well said President Alpha Conde: *"Building in Guinea rule of law, democracy, founded on the values of a rich multi-ethnic society of its cultural diversity, on the universal values contained in the UN Charter, the African Union, ECOWAS and the Guinean constitution "(Maramany Cissé: 2011.* Complex and highly political, reform focuses on a new concept of defense and security, based on a comprehensive, consensual and participatory requiring the involvement of all-stakeholders-and-to-national-ownership-all-levels.

The inter-Guinean dialogue on the proposed reform of the institution of the armed forces-then-allowed:

- The-demilitarization-of-the-capital-Conakry
- The-withdrawal-of-the-army-of-public-order-operations
- The-forced-retirement-of-about-4,000-military
- The creation of the High Command of the National Gendarmerie and the Directorate of Military-Justice
- The-return-of-the-Guinean-army-in-peacekeeping-operations

The reform has not curbed violence in Guinea, far from it. The last elections were used to measure the distance between the desire to have the defense and security forces better able to carry out its tasks and to participate in the democratization process; but it allowed to build or strengthen the rule of law.

E / The virtue of dialogue: the experience of Burkina Faso people

The popular uprising that took out the President Blaise Compaore in October 2014 was strangely similar to the one that prevailed January 3, 1966, with the President Maurice Yaméogo. As in 1966, the Burkinabe people took their destiny in hand and said "no" to an-autocratic-power.

However, it may be noted in the popular uprising of the 30th and 31st of October 2014 that took out President Blaise Compaore, is the large number of youth and women across the country who participated in the uprising and strong involvement of traditional leaders, including the key role played by the MooghoNaaba, the king of Mosse.

Indeed, Following the decision of the Council of Ministers of 21 October 2015 to validate the bill to amend Article 37 of the Constitution to enable Blaise Compaoré to stand for a further term of office in the presidential elections of 2015, parties opposition and civil society organizations have called for a national mobilization to ask the government to withdraw the bill. In this event, several ensued until the fall of President Blaise Compaoré. All levels of the society took part: October 27, women from Ouagadougou overstepped the prohibition of the municipality of Ouagadougou and organized a demonstration against the regime of Blaise Compaoré. The day of October 28 will be declared civil disobedience day. You could read on the Youth's T-shirts: Our number is our strength. On October 30 the President of Faso took the floor to call for dialogue while the opposition called for his immediate resignation. He eventually will leave the day-after,-October31st.

Behind the scenes, to prevent the country from falling into a civil war, religious and traditional leaders with in the center the figure of MooghoNaaba. The palace MooghoNaaba, corporation enclave is where the Burkinabe state has always found the resources to leave. This was the case in 1932 when NaabaSagha IV embodied the fight until the reconstruction of the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) created in 1919 and divided into colonial entities: Niger, French Sudan and Côte d ' Ivory. This is also the case today. The current tenant of the palace, whose name the NaabaBaongo "Baonga" means "plain, lowland" continued the work of his ancestors. Thus since the beginning of the crisis, those who felt particularly threatened the Prime Minister yacouba isaac zida fleeing in front of his RSP comrades found refuge at MooghoNaaba palace, so did those who sought to prevent the country from descending into chaos. The palace MoghoNaaba is a sanctuary of dialogue, peace and moral support.

The last act in the Burkinabe crisis that pitted the loyalist troops against the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) has been played in the MooghoNaaba court. The agreement has been signed between loyalist forces and the putschists of the Presidential Security Regiment were under its aegis. It is an appeasement agreement which provides that the RSP General Diendéré remain confined to his barracks while loyalist forces turned back about fifty kilometers from the capital. The men of the RSP then abandon all the checkpoints they were controlling in the city.

The lesson to be learned from the MooghoNaaba intervention and all other traditional chiefs in Burkina Faso (the supreme commander of Bobo Mandarès distinguished by its mediation the dark hours of the crisis) for the national interest is that the effectiveness

of their mediation and confidence they seem to have from all parties are one of the best mediators that fill the gaps of dialogue that the political dialogue never managed to fill. The MooghoNaaba and colleagues helped saving the institutions of Burkina Faso. This means that it is necessary to explore the traditional chiefs as a way of conflict resolution in our countries. These so-called traditional structures are often relegated as "old" and we turn back to them only when the solutions called "modern" offer no perspective. It is time that we give them an official status anchored in the constitution. This will enable them to fully play the role that is theirs: to establish and renew dialogue son whenever necessary.

IV / The experience of dialogue in Non Francophone African countries: the case of South Africa and Guinea Bissau

Dialogues have also been experienced in others African countries such as South Africa and Guinea Bissau

A / The path of forgiveness and reconciliation through dialogue: The South African model

" A person is a person because of other people "³⁵ In other words: "I am because we are" What Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize 1984 theorized in these terms: " My humanity is inextricably linked to what is yours " We are at the heart of Ubuntu, an African philosophy present in many African languages, especially those in the southern part of Africa. At the end of Apartheid, Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu choose as a remedy to the reconstruction of South Africa and to establish a life together to practice through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the values of Ubuntu: compassion, responsibility and forgiveness. By entering this route, the initiators of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission went beyond the Chilean model which they are inspired.

Indeed, by renouncing to apply retributive justice whose principle is the punishment of the guilty, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has put forward a justice based on a face-to-face between perpetrators and victims. A central place was given to the victims. The executioners wore in the violation of human rights, individual responsibility and thus answered the questions of the victims individually. Approximately 21,297 South Africans were heard by either investigators or during carnival hearing. Particular attention was paid to the relatives of the victims both in terms of the reception and listening. To support them, psychologist were part of the commissioners. In a "free word", which contrasts with conventional court proceedings, the Commission gave the whole character of an African dialogue without being one, since the mentioned facts were the subject of an investigation, it amnestied or not facts but not individuals. Thus in 7116 requests for amnesty, 1312 were granted and 5143 were rejected. This is the originality of the South African approach. Its way of judgment was not like the Nuremberg trials, victor's justice, nor blindly amnestied as in Chile (General Armistice) model that inspired post-apartheid South Africa.

³⁵ Zulu quote

The South African approach is strongly inspired by the African mediation which, while seeking to restore the dignity of the victim, does not lose sight of the backup group cohesion that reconciliation must mend the connections. For this purpose, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had to create a space and a public "Word" where victims and perpetrators met and adhered together in the new South Africa. That was in any case the spirit of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that the initiators, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, wanted to print the new South Africa. Indeed there is the spirit and the letter. Regarding the letter, some observers are struggling to say the weakness of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission lies precisely in the fact that it did not plan to investigate violations resulting from the implementation of the policy of apartheid, including the forced displacement of populations, restrictions on freedom of movement and residence imposed through legislation permits, or deprivation of voting rights for the vast majority of the South African population. This argument raises the question of compensation for only whites victims of South African, especially those who were part of the police rejected it arguing that the abuses have a special character because of the war situation and system policy that prevailed at the time. In other words, they were also victims. The argument also raises the question of the redistribution of wealth that many South Africans living in the Townships (as in the days of apartheid) remain excluded. The insecurity faced by the new South Africa is a result of the political choice of a liberal economy which favors a handful of South African whites and blacks at the expense of a majority who still remains poor.

The key question that can oppose the argument that it has been put too much emphasis on forgiveness and reconciliation is what were the resources held by South Africa out of apartheid on which they could rely on to build a just and multiracial society. José Zalaquett, a member of the Chilean CVR, quoted by Bucaille Lætitia³⁶, stated that the truth and reconciliation commissions had the aim of "*putting up a moral order that was broken or seriously damaged, or build a just political order in case History's memory does not reveal any*". Should not Guinea Bissau should learn from the South African experience of dialogue and reconciliation?

B / Chronic political instability, difficulty to pose an inter- Bissau Guinean dialogue

Contemporary history of Guinea-Bissau is a succession of acts of political and institutional and violence that profoundly marked the country. Chronic instability to which Guinea-Bissau has faced since independence is intrinsically linked to its history. A colonial history punctuated by acts of violence both between the colonizer and the population and the indigenous themselves.

Let us recall some historical facts. The Portuguese arrived in 1446 on the territory of present Guinea-Bissau they designated under the term "Province of Guinea" and later named it "Portuguese Guinea". Throughout the colonial period, the Guinea-Bissau population has constantly rebelled against the Portuguese occupation. Armed conflicts

³⁶ "Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa A political and social change," Foreign Policy 2/2007 (Summer), p. 313-325

have pitted indigenous from Bissau against colonizers until 1931 and against those of Bijagos until 1936. Soronda Diallo³⁷ described the situation at the time as follows:

"The effective occupation of the Portuguese Guinea the colonial power was made at a price of Euro-African wars and intra-African, genocide and destruction, in large measure, the pre-colonial African political space to establish a pure and simple system of domination ..."

At the end of the Second World War, while the other colonial powers had chosen to withdraw from their colonies, Portugal chooses to remain in the colonies refusing any idea of independence of its colonies: Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe.

In Guinea Bissau, the massacre of Dockers in the Pindjiguiti port in Bissau the 3rd of August 1959 was the trigger for the armed struggle for independence under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). An army was founded in 1964, supported by armed militants and popular defense militia. Independence was achieved in 1974 after rough struggles.

The post-colonial state will keep the marks of the war of liberation and of the organization of the politics implemented then. The first government of the independent Guinea-Bissau installed by the PAIGC had a military character. The armed forces had built a "center of power" in parallel of the government. The real power was thus exercised by the military, a destabilizing move for a young country. This situation has continued even when the Guinea-Bissau moved from single-party to multiparty system (Handem: 2013). The military has dismantled all governments that were against them one way or another.

The difficult path of dialogue in Guinea-Bissau

Depending on international aid, Guinea Bissau avoided since its independence in 1974 several security services reform initiatives and various programs of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). The Guinea-Bissau army has always been very suspicious and considers reform of the security services to be out of favor.

The 2010 coup against the government of Carlos Gomes Junior, which will be condemned by the international community was the beginning of dialogue between the military junta, political parties and civil society under the aegis of ECOWAS. The military junta, before the rejection of its proposal to dissolve the institutions and replace them for two years by the National Transitional Council (Conselho Nacional of Transição, CNT), an ad hoc legislature and a government of national unity and a transitional president, was forced to open up to dialogue. Further negotiations took place encompassing civil society and political parties. The junta then announces the establishment of a consultation forum open to all.

The Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS members, meeting in extraordinary summits in Abidjan and Dakar therefore established, in consultation with the military, political parties and representatives of civil society in Guinea-Bissau, a roadmap which

³⁷ I. Diallo Soronda. Journal of Guinean studies, New Series No. 8, Juhlo 2004 Contribution to the debate on identity and citizenship in Guinea-Bissau, P. 86.

will allow the return to constitutional order and have the State institutions to work again. It is this roadmap, despite PAIGC's opposition who wanted to return to its position before the coup of April 12 2012³⁸, that ECOWAS will implement while taking into consideration the concern of the PAIGC. It will be proposed to the President of the National Popular Assembly (a member of the PAIGC) to take on the office of President of transition and create the conditions for the appointment of a consensual Prime Minister.

From this experience, Guinea-Bissau has not really managed to succeed a dialog that allows the country to get out of the spiral of instability in which it is since the liberation struggle. The latest events that occurred in mid-August 2015³⁹ at the State summit between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, yet both from the PAIGC, suggests that an inclusive dialogue will not happen soon in Bissau. Dependent of international aid, it seems the Bissau Guinean political actors, under pressure from the international community, are developing for each crisis sort of a way out (temporarily); but there is no clear political will to solve the underlying problems that are causing conflicts. Political actors are aware of the problem: there is the army of course, but also profound antagonisms born since the liberation war.

With the presidential election of May 2014, Guinea-Bissau, long strangled by drug traffickers who took advantage of the state evanescence, re-establishes a political stability without any observer of Guinea-Bissau's political scene being able to predict the Army reaction if strong political decisions going against their interests were taken. Among the measures that have always been risks of destabilization in Guinea-Bissau, it must be mentioned the necessity of a reform of the security sector which should provide the Guinea-Bissau of a professional army that definitely deviate from interfering in the management of power.

Guinea-Bissau's civil society has always been involved in the search for solutions to all crises in Guinea-Bissau. Representatives of religious institutions, socio-professional associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively participated in national and international fora for dialogue between the various parties in conflict. Their voices are often raised to condemn coups perpetrated by the military. This can be illustrated by the joint statement that NGOs have published under the title: *"Positioning a group of national and international NGOs in Guinea-Bissau against the coup of April 12, 2012"*

Given the fragile situation in Guinea-Bissau, an inclusive dialogue seems necessary and must definitely be supported by civil society. Civil society is required to start listening to the people and act as an opposing force and end the Army-State dualism. It has to be built a bond of trust between the civil society and political parties for the establishment of a framework of permanent dialogue which allows to anticipate crises and to establish

³⁸ The PAIGC supported by the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), wanted the return of interim President and Prime Minister in exile and the continuation of the electoral process interrupted by the coup.

³⁹ In mid-August 2015 President Jose Mario Vaz dismisses his prime minister Domingos Simões Pereira after a crisis that opposed the two men for several weeks now. Mediation attempts by President Macky Sall and his Guinean counterpart Alpha Conde could not end the crisis.

dialogue wherever is necessary. The appointment of civil society in government is a step in the right direction⁴⁰.

Guinea-Bissau has 1,533,964 inhabitants in an area of 36,125 km² where over twenty ethnic groups are living together in harmony. Despite the policy of "divide and rule" practiced by the Portuguese colonizers, different peoples have remained sealed in the struggle for national liberation. Amilcar Cabral said about this: "*National liberation is an act of culture*" (Handem: 2013⁴¹). This assertion is still valid today. In the liberation war as now it is all the people of Guinea-Bissau, that must, in a constructive dialogue, support the establishment of democracy for the benefit of all the children of this beautiful land of Guinea Bissau.

V / The role of women in national dialogues: the experience of women in the Casamance and in the Mano River REFMAP (Network of Mano River Women for Peace)

Alongside the traditional dialogue structures which are composed mostly of men, we can see the movements of women, often very pragmatic, does not exclude any structure. True peacemakers, they mobilize positive forces capable of sorting out conflicts through dialogue and mediation by gathering the protagonists, particularly at a Community level. Members of all these structures generally act at local and regional and even national level, although their influence is more difficult to measure at national level.

It is interesting in the context of such a study, the role of women in conflict resolution through dialogue by involving other conflict resolution mechanisms.

A / Women facing the conflict in Casamance

Another experience of dialogue that deserves to be mentioned in this report is that of women of Casamance. Since the beginning of what is decorously called the crisis in Casamance, they have been intervening with the protagonists of the conflict by advocating for a dialogue that would save lives.

Indeed, the conflict opposing years the Government of Senegal and the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) for over thirty has caused hundreds slain, thousands injured, tens of thousands of displaced persons and refugees and whole villages wiped off the map of Senegal.

Given this circumstances, women in Casamance were involved in the search for solutions by using cultural and traditional resources, stories, forum-theater, loincloth woven symbolic, etc. All these tools are drawn from the cultural, religious and sociological legacy of Casamance. The main organizations that use these tools are Kabonketoor⁴², women "priestesses of the sacred wood" and USOFORAL⁴³.

⁴⁰ The current Minister of Justice of Guinea-Bissau is a member of civil society. She was the director of the observatory of human rights in Guinea-Bissau

⁴¹ Chosen works of Amilcar Cabral, the weapon of theory - unity and struggle, volume 1, 1978 Texts coordinated by Mario de Andrade

⁴² Kabonketoor means "forgive each other".

⁴³ USOFORAL means "let us unite." The term evokes solidarity

The approach of Casamance women regardless of the organization to which they belong resembles that of many women. This is to mobilize the positive cultural values to advocate dialogue between the various protagonists in the conflict while claiming a place as part of the process. Thus, to explain the situation of women in conflict and their initiatives in favor of dialogue for peace USOFORAL organized under the title "The loincloth that talks" a traveling exhibition with which women have traveled several countries with the same message: the loincloth that accompanies the symbol of life and death, the man in the middle, it was very important symbol being lost for lack of weavers. The exhibition "The loincloth who speaks" is worn by women and is about women, but through them, it is the troubled history of the whole community that shines through the loincloth. In this approach, seeks USOFORAL seeks to create the space in which the protagonists of the conflict may more easily find the path of dialogue, to change the situation and make the conflict its positive function in human relations.

In Casamance, women and children are traditionally considered as sacred persons, but the crisis tramples on that sacred and long, the woman as the child, are both victims of the conflict through the landmines or sporadic fighting that often occur in this part of Senegal. To open the dialogue with armed groups, women make them aware of the loss of positive values including one that protects the woman and child.

To strengthen their advocacy, women have built partnerships across Casamance and the sub-region, especially with the women of Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Guinea.

In order to gather the energies, skills and expertise of each of its members in order to propose concrete and relevant solutions to end the crisis in Casamance, women's organizations decide to end up in a platform called "Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance (PFPC) involving 170 women's associations in Casamance which represents more than 30,000 members. Their investment in peace has contributed to the decline in the level of violence and greater awareness by all Senegalese conflict in Casamance. Despite the success, the women of Casamance still have difficulties to impose their participation in the negotiations that have opened here and there, despite the support expressed by the Head of State, Mr Macky Sall speaking in 2012 with these words : *"I looked and I think I found [...] the secret door that opens to the splendor of the cities of peace. This door is you [...]. The torch of peace is there, then take it to illuminate our obstinate pursuit of peace*⁴⁴. "

At the last presidential elections of 2012, the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance took this opportunity to produce and submit to the candidates a memorandum for peace in Casamance. Only nine candidates have signed a commitment with this move to make every effort to restore peace if elected president. Every opportunity was good to enter to engage in dialogue with decision makers or the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), or both. Thus the candidates in the second round of 2012 elections were received by women who wanted to know their program for peace in Casamance. A new approach in the political history of Senegal. Women put the candidates in front of their responsibility for the future of this region.

⁴⁴ <http://www.lesoleil.sn/rencontre-avec-la-plate-forme-des-femmes-de-casamance-le-senegal-vous-donne-mandat-pour-reussir-cette-paix>

After the elections, women have taken immediate dialogue with representatives of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), the political representatives of Casamance, religious and traditional leaders as well as military authorities to lay the foundations of future negotiations. The strategy has paid off, since in January 2013, while opened a new stage in the negotiations for peace in Casamance, the coordinator of the platform has been invited by the government to be part of the delegation to engage dialogue with different stakeholders.

The battle for peace is not won yet in Casamance, but women were able to mark each stage of this battle a strong presence and ever-changing strategies to build dialogue between the protagonists.

B / Women's Movements: The Case of the Mano River Women's Peace Network (REFMAP)

Created in 2000 under the authority of ECOWAS and under the initiative of Women Africa Solidarity of the African Women Committee for Peace and Development (AWCPD), with the support of the African Union, UNDP, Nigerian Government and other development partners, the Network of the Mano River Women for Peace is actively involved in the processes of management and conflict resolution in the Mano River basin. To achieve their goals, joint structures owned by three countries: Guinea -Sierra Leone - Liberia and networks of stakeholders (the National Network of Traditional Communicators (RENACOT) is one example) to support conflict prevention efforts and peacebuilding are in place. The organization is directed by a Board of Directors at the sub regional level and has its headquarters in Freetown. In operation, each of the network's member countries held its activities in accordance with the realities dictated by the field. Thus, REFMAP Guinea section opened along the borders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Mali, twelve antennas at the prefectures of Forecariah, Kindia, Faranah, Kissidougou, Gueckedou, Macenta, N'Zérékoré, Lola, Beyla , Yomou, and Kankan Mandiana. With its antennas, REFMAP has developed expertise in mediation by using traditional conflict resolution techniques.

One of the most spectacular mediations by REFMAP was the one that allowed the releasing of the political dialogue between the presidents of the three governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Indeed, the war that burned Liberia and Sierra Leone for quite more than a decade threatened to be moved and stronger in Guinea, especially between 2000 and 2001 and in Ivory Coast, where in 2002 a conflict had to end political stability of the country of Houphouet Boigny. The entire Mano River region threatened to engulf. The Liberian Charles Taylor was on bad terms with the presidents in power in Guinea and Sierra Leone. At the highest level, political dialogue was blocked. Understanding the urgency of the situation, the Network of Mano River Women for Peace is then set to work developing several strategies. The most important of them was to personally meet the Presidents Conté, Taylor and Kabbah to advocate peace through dialogue. That resulted in February 2002 in a high-level meeting in Rabat, Morocco, under the auspices of King Mohammed VI. The United Nations has valued this action by awarding the REFMAP with the United Nations Prize for Human Rights.

If the experience of women of Casamance has shown its impact at the national level, women's experience of REFMAP demonstrated the role of women in the dialogue process at the regional level.

Throughout our analysis, the crises in the Great Lakes region and consultations they have generated and their mechanisms⁴⁵, and the consultation frameworks held in Francophone Africa and elsewhere, demonstrate that the dialogue continues to the present day to constitute a mode of conflict resolution. Sometimes, the artisans of the dialogue succeed, sometimes they fail. However, the dialogue itself does not constitute the obstacle but the way it is conducted or the ineffectiveness of the resolutions, hence the need to ensure effective method capable of becoming a tool of prevention and conflict resolution.

⁴⁵ Tchad, Central African Republic ... all these countries have experienced moments of dialogue with its advantages and limitations

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